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Free will is commonly defined as the ability to choose among options, control one’s actions in a way relevant to moral responsibility, or be the ultimate origin of one’s actions.
Free will is generally understood as the capacity to (a) choose between different possible courses of action, (b) exercise control over one’s actions in a way that is relevant to moral responsibility, or (c) be the ultimate source/originator of one’s actions. It is closely tied to ideas of moral responsibility and judgments such as praise, blame, and culpability, which are typically thought to apply only to actions that are freely chosen. Free will is also connected to practical notions like deliberation, advice, persuasion, and prohibition. Debates about free will focus on whether and how it can coexist with constraints such as physical determinism, divine foreknowledge, and other forms of determinism. Some philosophers hold that free will requires choices that are not determined by past events (libertarian views), while others argue that determinism is compatible with free will (compatibilist views). Incompatibilism is the view that free will and determinism cannot both be true, and it includes positions such as metaphysical libertarianism (determinism is false) and hard determinism/hard incompatibilism (determinism is true, so free will is not possible). Compatibilists instead maintain that free will can exist even if determinism is true, often redefining free will in terms of freedom from coercion, psychological responsiveness to reasons, or the ability to act according to one’s preferences.
Free will is commonly defined as the ability to choose among options, control one’s actions in a way relevant to moral responsibility, or be the ultimate origin of one’s actions.
Philosophical debate centers on whether free will can coexist with determinism, divine foreknowledge, and other constraints, leading to incompatibilist and compatibilist theories.
Incompatibilism claims free will and determinism are incompatible (including libertarian and hard determinist positions), while compatibilism claims free will is compatible with determinism by redefining what “free” means.
The capacity to choose among possible actions, exercise control in a way relevant to moral responsibility, or be the ultimate source of one’s actions.
The idea that agents can be appropriately held accountable for actions only when those actions are freely chosen.
The view that free will and determinism cannot both be true.
An incompatibilist view claiming determinism is false and that free will is possible at least for some agents.
An incompatibilist view claiming determinism is true and therefore free will does not exist.
A position claiming free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, making free will impossible.
A view that free will is impossible because both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with it, so the experience of free will is misleading.
The view that free will is compatible with determinism, often by redefining free will in terms of agency, reasons-responsiveness, or freedom from coercion.
A classical compatibilist idea that one has free will if one could have done otherwise without physical impediment, given different desires.
A compatibilist distinction between having the capacity to choose or will in a certain way and having the ability to carry out that choice.
The incompatibilist requirement that an agent must be the first source of their choices, not merely a participant in events caused entirely by factors outside their control.
“Can you explain what "Free will is commonly defined as the ability to choose among options, control one’s actions in a way relevant to moral responsibility, or be the ultimate origin of one’s actions." means in simple terms?”